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tween the latter and the house is as old as the common law." 1236
The Court distinguished the open fields from the curtilage 1237
and stated that no legitimate expectation of privacy attached to
open fields.1238 Therefore, the Court concluded that the
government's intrusion upon the open fields did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. 1239
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Hester in United
States v. Oliver.12 40 In Oliver, the Court stated that "open fields
do not provide a setting for those intimate activities that the
[Fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance." 124 1 The majority concluded that "the
text of the Fourth Amendment and . . . the historical and contemporary... understanding of its purposes, ... [does not cre-

ate a] legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free
from warrantless intrusion by government officers."

1242

FOURTHDEPARTMENT
24 3
People v. Caruso1

(decided June 7, 1991)

A criminal defendant alleged that his right to be protected
against unreasonable searches and seizures under the state 1244 and
federal 1245 constitutions was violated when police officers,
1236. Id. at 59.
1237. In defining the extent of the home's curtilage, the Court looks at four
factors:

[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether
the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the
nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987).
1238. See Hester, 265 U.S. at 258.
1239. Id. at 259.
1240. 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).

1241. Id. at 179.
1242. Id. at 181.
1243. 572 N.Y.S.2d 216 (4th Dep't 1991).
1244. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12.

1245. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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executing a search warrant on his residence, also searched the
shed in the back of his home. The court held that the search of
the shed at defendant's residence exceeded the scope of the search
warrant. 1246 In so holding, the court stated that "[o]ne of the
most fundamental characteristics of a search warrant is that '[t]he
authority to search is limited to the place described in the warrant
1247
and does not include additional or different places.'"
Police officers, while executing a search warrant on
defendant's residence, also searched the shed in back of the
defendant's home. The warrant authorizing the search only
described the defendant's residence.1248 The defendant's motion
to suppress evidence found in the shed was granted by the
suppressing court and the prosecution appealed.
The court unanimously affirmed the order of the suppressing
court and dismissed the indictment. The court stated that "[i]n
order to protect the Constitutional right of privacy from arbitrary
police intrusion, 'nothing should be left to the discretion of the
searcher in executing the warrant."' 1249 Instead, the court noted,
"'[p]articularity is required in order that the executing officer can
reasonably ascertain and identify the.

. .

places authorized to be

seized."' 125 0 As a result, the indictment was dismissed pursuant
to section 450.50(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL). 125 1
Under federal law "it is well settled that search warrants must
be strictly construed. The authority to search is limited to the
1246. Caruso, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
1247. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Keiningham v. United
States, 287 F.2d 126, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
1248. Id. The warrant described the residence to be searched as "[a] two

story flat roof dwelling, first floor. .. cement block, 2nd story brown barn
board .... " Id. The warrant also stated the street address of the defendant's
residence and its location on the block. Id.

1249. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d 396,
401, 330 N.E.2d 26, 31, 369 N.Y.S.2d 50, 57 (1975)).
1250. Id. (quoting Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d at 401, 330 N.E.2d at 31, 369

N.Y.S.2d at 57 (citations omitted)).
1251. N.Y. CRIm. PROc. LAW § 450.50(2) (McKinney 1983). ("The taking
of an appeal by the people ... from an order suppressing evidence constitutes

a bar to the prosecution of the accusatory instrument involving the evidence
ordered suppressed ....").
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place described in the warrant and does not include different or

additional places." 125 2 To ensure that the search is as limited as
possible, the warrant's particularity must be such "that the officer
. . . can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place

intended [to be searched]." 12 53 Because the Fourth Amendment
serves to protect the individual's privacy interest, "[w]hen investigators fail to limit themselves to the particulars in the warrant,
. . . the warrant['s] limitation becomes a practical nullity."

12 54

Therefore, "the search itself must be conducted in a reasonable
manner, appropriately limited to the scope and intensity called for
by the warrant." 125 5
However, in United States v. Bonner,1256 the First Circuit

reasoned that "search warrants .
should be considered in a
common sense manner, and hypertechnical readings should be
avoided." ' 1257 In Bonner, the warrant contained the word

"properties" instead of "premises," but the court found the
words were "sufficiently
synonymous to be inter1252. Keiningham, 287 F.2d at 129; see also Bivens v. Six Unkown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394 n.7 (1971) ("[IThe
Fourth Amendment confines an officer executing a search warrant strictly
within the bounds set by the warrant."); United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d
1238, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (it is "well accepted that the authority to search
granted by any warrant is limited to the specific places described"), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); United States v. Principe, 499 F.2d 1135, 1137
(1st Cir. 1974) (authority to search limited solely to places described in
warrant).
1253. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
1254. Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1257. The court went on to say that "[o]bedience
to the particularity requirement.. . i...
executing a search warrant is
therefore essential to protect against the centuries-old fear of general searches
and seizures." Id. See also WVolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (core of
the fourth amendment is to protect privacy rights from arbitrary police
intrusion), overruled by Napp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (nothing should be left to discretion of
searcher executing warrant), overruled by Harris v. United States 331 U.S.
145 (1947).
1255. Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1256.
1256. 808 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006 (1987).
1257. Id. at 868 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969);
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).
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changeable." ' 125 8 The properties listed on the warrant to be
searched included a house, trailer, and a barn. Also mentioned in
the warrant, but not listed under properties to be searched, was a
detached two car garage. However, the court found that the
warrant was "sufficient to embrace the garage located on the
Bonner property." 125 9 The Bonner court stated that had the
garage not been mentioned in the warrant, "it [nevertheless]
would have been reasonably considered within the scope of the
warrant" because it was clear from the affidavit that the agents
intended to search the garage. 12 60
The New York State Constitution, similar to its federal
counterpart, requires that "no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched .

...
"1261 In People V.

Green, the court of appeals stated that a critical and fundamental
characteristic of a search warrant is that "[t]he authority to search
is limited to the place described in the warrant and does not
include additional or different places." 1262
In People v. Nieves, 1263 the court of appeals addressed the particularity requirement. The court stated that the purpose of the
particularity requirement was to combat the "evils associated
with the use of general warrants in England and the detested writs
of assistance in the Colonies." ' 1264 To protect the constitutional
1258. Id.
1259. Id.
1260. Id. For additional cases where search warrants authorized the search of
premises at a certain address that were held to include buildings standing on
that land see United States v. Williams, 687 F.2d 290, 293 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a warrant describing the geographical location to be searched by
commonly accepted mining claim numbers was a reasonable description and
means of identifying the premises to be searched); United States v. Meyer, 417
F.2d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1969) (stating that "[t]he word 'premises' when
used to describe an estate in land almost invariably refers to land and the
tenements or appurtances thereto").
1261. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1262. Id. at 499, 310 N.E.2d at 534-35, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 935 (quoting
Keiningham v. United States, 287 F.2d 126, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
1263. 36 N.Y.2d 396, 330 N.E.2d 26, 369 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1975).
1264. Id. at 400, 330 N.E.2d at 31, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 56.
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right of privacy from arbitrary police intrusion, the court stated
that "nothing should be left to the discretion of the searcher in
executing the warrant." 12 65 Therefore, "particularity is required
in order that the executing officer can reasonably ascertain and
identify... the persons or places authorized to be searched and
the things authorized to be seized."' 1266 However, the Nieves
court noted that particularity does not require "hypertechnical
accuracy and completeness of description .... ,1 267 Instead, the
descriptions in the warrant should be sufficiently definite to
permit the searcher to identify the premises, persons or things
1268
that are going to be searched.
Under both the state and federal constitutions, the defendant's
right to privacy is protected against arbitrary police intrusion.
The authority to search is limited to the area described in the
warrant and does not include additional or different places. As
such, the discretion of the searcher is limited when executing a
warrant. While particularity is required to provide the officer
with a reasonable description of the area intended by the warrant,
the officer need not abandon his or her common sense when interpreting the warrant's scope.

1265. Id. at 401, 330 N.E.2d at 31, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 57 (citing Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), overruled by Harris v. United States
331 U.S. 145 (1947)).
1266. Id. (citing Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)); see also
People v. Henley, 135 A.D.2d 1136, 523 N.Y.S.2d 258 (4th Dep't 1987),
appeal denied, 71 N.Y.2d 897, 523 N.E.2d 314 (1988).
1267. Nieves, 36 N.Y.2d at 401, 330 N.E.2d at 31, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 57.
1268. Id.; see also Henley, 135 A.D.2d at 1136, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 259
(noting that "[tihe constitutional requirements will be satisfied if there is a
non-confusing description by which any officer executing the warrant could
not be mislead... ").
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